Bines v. Kulaylat by unknown
2000 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-12-2000 
Bines v. Kulaylat 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000 
Recommended Citation 
"Bines v. Kulaylat" (2000). 2000 Decisions. 126. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/126 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed June 12, 2000 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 98-1635 
 
FRANK BINES 
 
v. 
 
N. KULAYLAT; 
 
MITCHELL SADAR; N. HOLLAND-HULL; 
SADAR PSYCHOLOGICAL SERVICE; 
 
DENNIS MOYER, Dr.; DORIS STABLEY; 
SKIP FIELDS; SPECIAL NEEDS UNIT, S.N.U.; 
MARY ANN WILLIAMS; THOMAS D. STACHELEK, MR.; 
 
DONALD T. VAUGHN, MR.; 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 
 
NUHAD KULAYLAT, M.D., 
       Appellant 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(D.C. No. 96-cv-01528) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
Appellee Frank Bines, a state prison inmate, alleges that 
numerous defendants are liable for providing him with 
inadequate medical care during his incarceration. Appellant 
Nuhad Kulaylat, a contract physician, is one of the 
defendants named in Bines' complaint. Kulaylat moved for 
summary judgment based, inter alia, on a good-faith 
defense. The District Court denied the motion, concluding 
that genuine issues of material fact remain in dispute. 
Kulaylat appeals, arguing that the District Court erred by 
denying summary judgment based on his good-faith 
defense because the record does not contain any evidence 
that he acted in bad faith. He further argues that Bines 
waived any opposition to the defense when he failed to 
respond to the motion for summary judgment. Although he 
failed to assert it as a basis for summary judgment, 
Kulaylat now asks us to decide whether he is entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
 
We do not reach the merits of Kulaylat's arguments, 
because we hold that an order denying summary judgment 
based on a good-faith defense does not constitute afinal, 
collateral order appealable under 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
Because we hold that such an order is not final, and that 
the qualified-immunity issue is not properly before us, we 
will dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 
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I. Background 
 
At all times relevant to this appeal, Frank Bines was an 
inmate at the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania's State 
Correctional Institution at Graterford. Dr. Nuhad Kulaylat 
was a private physician who worked as an independent 
contractor for Correctional Physician Services, Inc. 
Correctional Physician Services was a private corporation 
under contract with the Pennsylvania Correctional System 
to provide certain specified medical services to Graterford's 
inmates. Through this chain of contractual relationships, 
Bines was referred to Kulaylat for medical treatment. 
 
During a November 1995 medical consultation, Kulaylat 
informed Bines that Bines was infected with the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). The virus had apparently 
caused lymph nodes on Bines' neck and chest to swell and 
harden. Complaining that the swelling was painful, Bines 
requested that Kulaylat either resect the lymph nodes or 
prescribe palliative medication. Kulaylat concluded that 
there was no medical reason to excise the swollen lymph 
nodes and declined to do so. He also concluded that"Bines 
did not show any indication of suffering from severe and 
substantial pain as a result of the lymph nodes," and so 
prescribed no pain medication at that time. See  App. at 
93a. 
 
Over the next two months, Kulaylat examined Bines on at 
least two more occasions. Each time, Bines renewed his 
request that his swollen lymph nodes be removed, or that 
Kulaylat prescribe medication to ease the pain they were 
causing. Each time, Kulaylat concluded that neither were 
medically necessary. He did, however, prescribe other 
medications, as well as nutritional supplements, to treat 
other symptoms associated with Bines' HIV infection. 
 
In February 1996, Bines filed a civil complaint against 
the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, various 
Department employees, Kulaylat and a number of other 
private defendants. Although the complaint alleged 
numerous violations of various constitutionally protected 
rights, only one claim is relevant to this appeal. According 
to that claim, Bines alleged that the defendants had acted 
with deliberate indifference to his medical needs and 
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violated the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel 
and unusual punishment. For present purposes, we need 
not recite the allegations more specifically except to note 
that Bines accused Kulaylat of acting with deliberate 
indifference by repeatedly declining Bines' requests to treat 
his painful and swollen lymph nodes. 
 
In his answer to Bines' complaint, Kulaylat pleaded 
twenty-three separate affirmative defenses, including both 
qualified immunity and good faith. He subsequently moved 
the District Court for summary judgment based on, inter 
alia, his good-faith defense. Although the motion also 
asserted three other grounds for summary judgment, 
qualified immunity was not among them. Bines did not 
oppose the motion. See Dist. Ct. Order at 2. 
 
The District Court rejected Kulaylat's motion for 
summary judgment on all grounds asserted therein. With 
respect to Kulaylat's good-faith defense, the court 
concluded that summary judgment was inappropriate 
because there remained genuine issues of material fact 
concerning Kulaylat's state of mind. In other words, the 
District Court concluded that the "sparse" record before it 
was insufficient to support Kulaylat's claim that he had 
treated Bines in the good-faith belief that his treatment did 
not deprive Bines of his constitutional rights. See Dist. Ct. 
Order at 4; see also Def.'s Motion for Summary Judgment 
at 6:17-19 (App. at 66a). The court also noted, however, 
that Kulaylat could renew his motion once the record had 
been further developed. See id. Instead, Kulaylat filed this 
interlocutory appeal, arguing that the District Court erred 
by denying summary judgment on his good-faith defense. 
He also asks us to determine in the first instance whether 
he is entitled to qualified immunity. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
A. The Good-Faith Claim 
 
As a general rule, we have no jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. S 1291 to review interlocutory orders such as a 
denial of summary judgment. Nevertheless, the collateral- 
order doctrine excepts a narrow range of interlocutory 
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decisions from the general rule. See Cohen v. Beneficial 
Indust. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S. Ct. 1221 (1949); 
We, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 322, 324 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
 
There is no question that orders denying absolute 
immunity are reviewable on interlocutory appeal. See e.g., 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982); Helstoski v. 
Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); Abney v. United States, 431 
U.S. 651 (1977). In Mitchell v Forsyth, the Supreme Court 
extended the doctrine to include denial of claims to 
qualified immunity, though only to the extent such denial 
turns on an issue of law rather than fact. 472 U.S. 511, 
525 (1985). 
 
The Supreme Court has not decided whether denial of 
summary judgment based on a good-faith defense can ever 
fall within the collateral-order doctrine. We have not, nor 
has any other circuit court of appeals, decided the issue. 
Nevertheless, we find our course amply guided by previous 
decisions in which we have addressed the collateral-order 
doctrine. Those decisions clearly indicate that denial of 
summary judgment based on a good-faith defense does not 
permit an interlocutory appeal. 
 
We have repeatedly expressed our concern that the 
collateral-order doctrine not "swallow" thefinal-judgment 
rule, and have " `consistently construed the [doctrine] 
narrowly rather than expansively.' " Transtech Indus., Inc. v. 
A&Z Septic Clean, 5 F.3d 51, 57 (3d Cir. 1993) (quoting 
Lusardi v. Xerox Corp., 747 F.2d 174, 176-77 (3d Cir. 1984) 
and citing Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 
s.l.a., 947 F.2d 49, 54 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also We, Inc., 
174 F.3d at 324; Demenus v. Tinton 35 Inc., 873 F.2d 50, 
53 (3d Cir. 1989); Borden Co. v. Syk, 410 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 
1969)). 
 
In deciding whether a challenged order fits within the 
collateral-order doctrine, we have applied the three-prong 
analysis established in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 
U.S. 463, 98 S. Ct. 2454 (1978). See Transtech Indus., 5 
F.3d at 56-57. To fall within the doctrine, "the order must: 
(1) conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve 
an important issue completely separable from the merits of 
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the action; and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal 
from a final judgment." Transtech Indus. , 5 F.3d at 55 
(citing Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S. Ct. at 
2457). 
 
Applying those factors in this case, we first conclude that 
denial of summary judgment based on Kulaylat's good-faith 
defense does not conclusively determine the disputed 
question. The District Court has merely concluded that the 
current record leaves open genuine issues of material fact 
concerning Kulaylat's state of mind at the time he treated 
Bines. The court left open the possibility that Kulaylat 
could renew his motion for summary judgment once the 
record is more fully developed. 
 
In any event, denial of summary judgment does not 
preclude Kulaylat from asserting, or the fact finder from 
accepting, his good-faith defense at trial. And, significantly, 
unlike qualified immunity, a successful good-faith defense 
merely protects the defendant from liability, not from suit. 
See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 165 (1992) (concluding 
that the entitlement to a good-faith defense would not 
entitle private parties to the qualified immunity from suit 
accorded to government officials). Cf. We, Inc., 174 F.3d at 
330 (holding that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides 
immunity from liability, not from suit). 
 
Second, Kulaylat's good-faith claims are not completely 
separable from the merits of the underlying action. Unlike 
the objective test applied to claims of qualified immunity, 
see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), good faith 
turns on the defendant's subjective state of mind. We 
cannot determine whether Kulaylat acted with deliberate 
indifference to Bines' serious medical needs without 
addressing factual questions that the District Court has yet 
to resolve. 
 
Third, Kulaylat's good-faith defense will not be effectively 
unreviewable on appeal from final judgment. As already 
noted, the defense, if accepted, does not make him immune 
from suit. Thus, requiring him to await final judgment 
before bringing his appeal would not cause the irretrievable 
loss of any right to which he is entitled. If the jury returns 
a verdict against him, Kulaylat may still move the court to 
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grant judgment as a matter of law, or to grant a new trial. 
If the court declines, he may still appeal the final judgment 
to this court. Thus, Kulaylat's good-faith claim fails to 
satisfy any of the collateral-order doctrine's three 
requirements for interlocutory appeal. We therefore hold 
that we lack jurisdiction to review denial of that claim in 
this interlocutory appeal. 
 
B. The Qualified-Immunity Claim 
 
In addition to seeking interlocutory review of his good- 
faith defense, Kulaylat also invites us to consider his claim 
to qualified immunity. We decline to do so because Kulaylat 
failed to raise qualified immunity as a basis for summary 
judgment. As a general rule, we will not review an issue on 
appeal that has not been raised below. See Pritzker v. 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 
1115 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Singleton v. Wulff , 428 U.S. 
106, 120 (1976). Although we have made exceptions where 
failure to consider the issue would result in manifest 
injustice, see Pritzker, 7 F.3d at 1115 (citing Houghton v. 
American Guar. Life Ins. Co., 692 F.2d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 
1982)), we find no potential for manifest injustice here. The 
interlocutory nature of this appeal leaves Kulaylat with full 
opportunity to assert his qualified-immunity claim in the 
District Court. 
 
The only remaining questions, which revolve around 
Kulaylat's subjective state of mind, are factual rather than 
legal. The District Court concluded that "[v]iewed in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiff, [the record] establishes 
a material fact concerning Dr. Kulaylat's mental state, that 
is, whether he acted with deliberate indifference." Dist. Ct. 
Order at 3. Accordingly, we would lack jurisdiction to 
consider Kulaylat's qualified-immunity claim even had he 
asserted it as a basis for summary judgment below. 
 
III. Conclusions 
 
Denial of a motion for summary judgment based on a 
good-faith defense does not satisfy the requirements of the 
collateral-order doctrine. Accordingly, we hold that we lack 
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jurisdiction to review the good-faith claim presented in this 
interlocutory appeal. 
 
We further hold that because Kulaylat did not assert his 
qualified-immunity claim below, he is barred from raising it 
in this appeal. Therefore, we will dismiss this appeal, and 
all issues it raises, for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 
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